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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Dropsy testimony” is testimony by a police officer, typically during 
a suppression hearing, claiming that a defendant dropped illegal drugs, 
“thus leaving them in plain view or abandoning them . . . .”1  After the 
United States Supreme Court’s 1961 landmark decision in Mapp v. 
Ohio,2 in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to the 
states, in addition to the federal government, there was a reported spike 
in police dropsy testimony.  Irving Younger, former prosecutor, judge, 
and law professor,3 explained the spike this way: Soon after Mapp, 
“police made the great discovery that if the defendant drops the narcotics 
on the ground, after which the policeman arrests him, the search is 
reasonable and the evidence is admissible.”4  The implication was that 
police were distorting the truth to prevent judges from suppressing 
inculpatory evidence and to save their drug cases from eventual 
dismissal.5 
In Kansas, there may be a more modern-day type of dropsy 
testimony designed to justify pretextual drug investigations of out-of-
state cars with Hispanic drivers.  A stop is “pretextual” when officers use 
                                                     
 ∗ Associate Professor, the University of Kansas School of Law.  My sincerest thanks go to 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Jelani Jefferson Exum, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, and L.M. Reeves for 
providing thoughtful and constructive comments on an earlier draft.  I also owe many thanks to my 
talented research assistants Josh A. Bender and Chris Grenz. 
 1. Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 
n.110 (2001).  See also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good 
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 557 (2006) (explaining that in “dropsy” 
cases, officers “testify that a fleeing suspect conveniently ‘dropped’ or abandoned drugs while in 
flight, thus losing any privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment”). 
 2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 3. See Stephen Labaton, Irving Younger, Lawyer, 55, Dies; Judge, Law Professor and Author, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1988, Obituaries, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/15 
/obituaries/irving-younger-lawyer-55-dies-judge-law-professor-and-author.html. 
 4. Irving Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure Dead?, TRIAL, Aug.–
Sept. 1967, at 41. 
 5. Id. 
0.6.0_WILSON FINAL 5/31/2010  2:16:00 PM 
1180 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
a valid reason for a traffic stop to carry out some other investigatory 
purpose for which there is no legal justification.6  A stop would also be 
pretextual if an officer lied and said that a traveler committed a traffic 
violation, creating a false basis to stop a car.7  The first pretext is legal, 
the second unlawful in violation of the Fourth Amendment.8  A review of 
data from the District of Kansas indicates that Kansas police9 rely on 
minor traffic violations as an excuse to stop and look in out-of-state cars 
and to gain face-to-face interaction with certain travelers whom they 
speculate may be transporting drugs.  Sometimes Kansas police stop a 
car, citing a dirty tag or a faulty tag light.10  Recently, officers have relied 
on lane violations as grounds for traffic stops.  Lane infractions allow 
Kansas police to stop a car when a driver veers, even just a bit, from his 
lane of travel and touches or crosses a center line or a “fog line.”11  Once 
an officer stops the car for drifting from one lane, the officer engages the 
occupants with questions about their travel plans, advises them that he 
will merely issue a warning for the minor infraction, and, having gained 
their gratitude for the painless warning, asks the occupants for 
permission to search the car, or their bodies, clothing, or belongings.  If, 
during the stop, the officer ultimately uncovers what he intends to 
find12—contraband—the defendant is charged with a crime, sometimes 
in federal court.13  At a subsequent hearing to evaluate a defendant’s 
                                                     
 6. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A pretextual stop 
occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place, 
or to interrogate a person for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to support a stop.”), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Botero-
Ospira, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 7. See Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police 
Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment’s Outer Frontier, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1996) 
(defining pretext as “a legal justification that is used to mask the real, legally unjustifiable motive for 
a seizure”). 
 8. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515; Leary & Rae, supra note 7, at 1009. 
 9. Except where otherwise indicated, in this Article “police” includes local, county, state, and 
federal peace officers who work anywhere within the District of Kansas. 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Paez, No. 09-40006-JAR, 2009 WL 1739907, at *1 (D. Kan. June 
18, 2009) (Kansas State Trooper conducts stop of tractor trailer for illegible Indiana tag); United 
States v. Johnson, No. 08-40010-01-RDR, 2009 WL 1468486, at *1 (D. Kan. May 22, 2009) 
(Potowatomi Tribal Police cite tag light violation and failing to signal as basis for a stop). 
 11. A “fog line” is the white line on the right-hand side of a road, separating the lane for travel 
from the shoulder. 
 12. This inference about the officers’ intentions is one drawn from the data, especially the data 
showing that officers issue warnings, not citations, for fog-line infractions and that they quickly 
move from a discussion of the infraction to inquiry of possible drug trafficking. 
 13. More drug cases are prosecuted in state court than in federal court.  See, e.g., Office of 
National Drug Control Policy Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, State of Kansas Profile of 
Drug Indicators, June 2008, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/statelocal/ks/ks.pdf 
(showing that in 2006, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency made 255 arrests for drug violations in 
Kansas while overall there were 11,937 adult drug arrests in the state during that time). 
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motion to suppress the contraband,14 the officer testifies to his reason for 
the stop—“you crossed the fog line,” “drifted from your lane of travel,” 
or “failed to maintain a single lane.”  The officer typically makes no 
mention of the reasons for selecting this particular car for careful 
scrutiny.  As long as an officer has a legally sufficient reason to stop a 
car, his ulterior motives in a given case are viewed as irrelevant for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.15 
This Article urges readers to stand back from any one particular fog-
line case, in which it appears that an officer acted diligently and 
perceptively, uncovering a significant crime during a standard traffic 
stop, and to look for patterns emerging from a series of cases.  From this 
multi-case perspective, it seems that fog-line stops may be nothing more 
than a pretext for drug investigations.  Some of these pretextual stops 
probably follow from an actual traffic infraction.  Other fog-line stops 
may amount to a new type of police dropsy testimony in that Kansas 
police come to federal court and offer a post-hoc justification for an 
otherwise unlawful search that, nevertheless, uncovered contraband.  
Given the limited data, there is no way to know whether Kansas police 
are engaging in lawful, but controversial, pretextual stops or, conversely, 
dishonestly claiming to witness lane drifts that never occurred.  In either 
event, Kansas officers (consciously or subconsciously) appear to be 
acting on unreliable stereotypes, such as skin color and out-of-state 
status, in deciding which cars to stop and investigate. 
In making a case for increased attention to fog-line (and similar) 
traffic stops, this Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II examines data 
from orders recently decided in the District of Kansas to show, 
circumstantially, that Kansas police are using fog-line violations as a 
ruse to stop out-of-state cars driven by people of Hispanic ethnicity.  Part 
III summarizes the law relevant to pretextual fog-line traffic stops, 
including federal and state law governing Kansas police.  Finally, Part IV 
offers a few observations about why Kansas police should try harder to 
avoid pretextual fog-line stops. 
II. RECENT JUDICIAL ORDERS FROM THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
This Article is informed by my review of criminal orders deciding 
motions to suppress evidence issued recently by federal trial judges in 
                                                     
 14. The exclusionary rule generally precludes the use of evidence from a defendant’s criminal 
trial when police gathered the evidence by violating the Fourth Amendment and certain other 
constitutional provisions.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 15. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) and discussion infra Part III.A. 
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the District of Kansas.  I reviewed all criminal orders published on the 
“Recent Opinions” section of the website for the United States District 
Court for the District of Kansas for the period August 1, 2008 through 
September 15, 2009 (a period of approximately thirteen months).16  I 
began my review on September 10, 2009.  In all, I reviewed 476 orders 
and culled those for rulings on motions to suppress.17  During the 
applicable time period, the court decided thirty-five motions to 
suppress.18  A list of these thirty-five orders, with accompanying case 
names, numbers, and other pertinent information, follows this Article as 
an appendix.  Of the court’s thirty-five orders, nine (about 26%) involved 
evidence seized during a traffic stop, as compared to evidence uncovered 
during the search of a home or office, or the search of a car for reasons 
other than a traffic violation.  In five of the nine traffic stops 
(approximately 56%), Kansas police cited a fog-line infraction or similar 
lane drift as the reason for the stop.19  Although Kansas police 
purportedly stopped all five vehicles for leaving their lane of travel, 
when considered as a group, officers appeared to have a different reason 
for each of the stops.  While the sample size is admittedly small, the 
                                                     
 16. The orders can be accessed at http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/ under the Recent Opinions 
link. 
 17. In theory, the 476 number would represent every order issued in a criminal case during the 
specified time because the website is designed to provide access to all publically-available orders 
from the court.  But information obtained from the Clerk’s Office, United States District Court for 
the District of Kansas, indicates that each judge’s chambers is responsible for posting its own orders.  
Therefore, if there is human error in publishing the orders to the website, the errors will result in 
fewer than all orders on the site.  As a result, it is likely that judges in the District of Kansas issued 
more than 476 criminal orders in the given time period.  In addition, sealed orders are unavailable by 
definition. 
 18. This number reflects all of the motions to suppress that are available on the court’s website 
in the approximately thirteen-month period.  Occasionally, a defendant filed a motion to reconsider a 
motion to suppress.  These motions for reconsideration are also included in the count of orders on 
motions to suppress. 
 19. These cases include United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL 
2760798, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (claiming that the defendant crossed over the center line); 
United States v. Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1180 (D. Kan. 2009) (asserting that car 
drifted slightly into another lane); United States v. Perales, No. 08-40055-JAR, 2008 WL 4974807, 
at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2008) (asserting that vehicle crossed the fog line); United States v. Rocha, 
No. 06-40057-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (claiming that recreational 
vehicle crossed the fog line); United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1 
(D. Kan. Aug. 5, 2008) (asserting that car crossed the fog line and center line). 
The other four orders involving traffic stops revealed that vehicles were cited for: (1) an 
illegible tag, United States v. Paez, No. 09-40006-JAR, 2009 WL 1739907, at *1 (D. Kan. June 18, 
2009); (2) a positive sniff from a drug-dog in a parking lot, United States v. Johnson, No. 08-40010-
RDR, 2009 WL 1468486, at *1 (D. Kan. May 22, 2009); (3) speeding in a work zone while under 
surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Agency, United States v. Beltran-Aguilar, No. 08-20106-
KHV, 2009 WL 103642, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 14, 2009); and (4) suspicious activity while parked in a 
parking lot, United States v. Salazar, No. 08-20084-KHV, 2009 WL 352605, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 
2009). 
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orders are informative.  They show a pattern—in all five cases, Kansas 
police targeted out-of-state cars driven by people of Hispanic ethnicity so 
that they could obtain the occupants’ permission to search the vehicles 
for drugs.20 
A. Recent Pretextual Police Stops in Kansas 
During the thirteen months reviewed, at least nine minor traffic 
infractions ultimately resulted in felony criminal cases in federal court.  
In eight of those nine traffic-stop cases (approximately 89%), the 
defendants appear to have been of Hispanic ethnicity.21  In five of the 
nine cases, the federal criminal case began with a lane violation, and 
100% of the defendants and the other occupants of the vehicles in those 
lane-violation cases appear to have been Hispanic.  The defendants and 
other occupants include: Jose Maldonado; Gonzalo Maldonado and 
Manuel Garcia; Felipe Perales; Luis Diaz and Stephen Demalleo; and 
Julian Rocha, Ericka Rocha, and Gerardo Gaxiola.22  The high 
percentage of Hispanic defendants stands out because Kansas has a 
relatively small Hispanic and Latino population.  In 2008, the population 
of Kansas was approximately 2,802,134, and persons of Hispanic or 
                                                     
 20. I wondered how officers could see into cars from significant distances to select certain 
drivers.  An interview of a current federal public defender in the District of Kansas revealed that 
often the police pull up beside a car before falling back and activating the patrol car’s lights or siren, 
signaling for the citizen driver to pull over.  The federal defender’s information is corroborated by 
the facts in the Diaz case in which the Trooper pulled alongside the car occupied by defendants 
Demalleo and Diaz.  See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Suppress 
Evidence, United States v. Diaz [and Demalleo], No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664 (D. Kan. 
Jul. 7, 2008). 
 21. By Hispanic, I mean to suggest ancestral ties to Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or South or 
Central America.  This observation rests primarily on the names of the defendants, each of whom 
was identified by a common Hispanic surname.  But in some cases, the ethnicity of the defendant 
was confirmed by his own pleading (usually a brief in support of the motion to suppress), the judge’s 
order, or the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress.  (When readily available, these court 
documents were accessed through Pacer.)  For instance, in the case of defendant Perales, the judge’s 
order, which denies the defendant’s motion to suppress, implies that the defendant’s primary 
language is Spanish, supporting the inference that he is of Hispanic ethnicity.  See Perales, 2008 WL 
4974807, at *2 (noting that during a post-arrest interview of the defendant, an agent who is “fluent in 
Spanish” was available, but not needed, to interpret).  In United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, the 
judge’s order indicates that the driver of the vehicle spoke little English, supporting the inference 
that the defendant is Hispanic.  See 2009 WL 2760798, at *1.  In the case of Jose Maldonado, the 
transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress reveals cross-examination questions from the 
defendant’s lawyer confirming that the defendant’s ethnicity is Hispanic and references to the 
defendant’s “limited knowledge of the English language.”  Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 
1183.  And, in the case of Julian Rocha, the court found that the occupants of the recreational vehicle 
did not have “trouble speaking or understanding English.”  Order of October 2, 2008 at 6, Rocha, 
2008 WL 4498950, at *2. 
 22. See cases cited supra note 21. 
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Latino origin made up only 9.1% of the total.23  Moreover, a study of 
police profiling in Kansas published in 2003 found that persons of 
Hispanic ethnicity experience more police profiling24 than black or white 
citizens.25 
In each of the five fog-line cases, a Kansas officer26 reportedly 
stopped the defendant’s car because the driver drifted from a lane of 
travel and breached K.S.A. section 8-1522(a), requiring drivers to stay 
“as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.”27  Despite the lane 
drifts, in every case, the officer decided not to issue the driver a ticket.  
Instead, the driver was given a “warning.”28  The officer then questioned 
the car’s occupants about their travel plans, usually including their place 
of departure and their intended destination.  In every case, the car was 
traveling to or through Kansas from out of state.  Jose Maldonado was 
driving from Texas with a Texas license plate.  Julian Rocha was riding 
in a rented recreational vehicle driven by Gerardo Gaxiola.  Rocha and 
Gaxiola were traveling from California, and the R.V. was rented and 
registered in California.  Defendant Perales was driving from California 
to Kansas City.  Defendant Demalleo was riding in a car driven by Luis 
                                                     
 23. See United States Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20000.html (last 
visited March 11, 2010).  The use of census statistics as a benchmark of comparison for racial 
profiling is not without critics.  See A Multijurisdictional Assessment of Traffic Enforcement and 
Data Collection in Kansas, The Police Foundation, at 11, Feb. 2003 [hereinafter A 
Multijurisdictional Assessment] (stating that the use of census data “will not serve as reliable 
benchmarks” and relying on surveys of highway transient traffic as a comparator). 
 24. The study defined racial profiling as “selectively stopping, questioning, and searching 
people on the basis of arbitrary minor offenses and the color of their skin.”  A Multijurisdictional 
Assessment, supra note 23, at xv. 
 25. Id. at 66.  “The data strongly suggest that the Emporia police are targeting Hispanic 
motorists.”  Id. at 77, 80.  The data showed that “[t]he Olathe Police Department is stopping more 
Black and Hispanic motorists than would be expected on the basis of their presence in the transient 
population.”  Id. at 90.  “[T]here are large disparities with regard to Hispanic motorists at the two 
locations with the largest number of stops” by the Osage County Sheriff’s Department.  Id. at 105.  
“[T]here are serious disparities shown by the [Kansas Highway Patrol] in the stopping of both Black 
and Hispanic motorists.”  Id. at 127.  But see id. at 65–66 (noting that the Wichita Police Department 
was taking measures to “fight against racial/ethnic profiling” which were paying off and that stops of 
Hispanics were “at the lower range of the benign area”). 
 26. In three of the five cases, the officer was a member of the Kansas Highway Patrol.  In one, 
the officers worked for the Wichita Police Department.  In the remaining case, the officer was an 
employee of the Shawnee County Sheriff’s Office. 
 27. This law provides that when a roadway is divided into two clearly marked lanes of traffic, 
“[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be 
moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with 
safety.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1522(a) (2008). 
 28. Compare this 100% warning rate with the fact that out of all stops (traffic and pedestrian) 
conducted by officers of the Wichita Police Department Jan. 1–June 30, 2001, 57.1% resulted in the 
issuance of a citation.  See BRIAN L. WITHROW, THE WICHITA STOP STUDY 39 (Midwest Criminal 
Justice Institute, Jan. 2002).  Interestingly, Wichita police also issued a disproportionate number of 
warnings, rather than citations, to Hispanic citizens.  See id. at 41. 
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Diaz.  Demalleo and Diaz, described in the judge’s order as two well-
dressed men, were driving from Denver, returning to Missouri, where the 
men had rented a car for the trip.  Gonzalo Maldonado, with Manuel 
Garcia as his passenger, was stopped by the Kansas Highway Patrol on 
his way from Sacramento, California to Kansas City.29 
In each case studied, after an officer questioned the occupants and 
checked their driver’s licenses and the car’s registration, the officer 
returned the documents and took “a couple of steps back towards the 
patrol car”30 before re-engaging the occupants to ask more questions.31  
In each of the five fog-line cases, the officers’ follow-up questions were 
directed at uncovering evidence of drug trafficking.  For instance, in the 
case involving defendants Gonzalo Maldonado and Garcia, the officer 
asked “whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle, such as 
‘cervesa,’ ‘pistoles,’ drugs, or illegal aliens.”32  In the case of defendant 
Rocha, the officer asked whether there were “any drugs or contraband.”33  
After this seemingly scripted give-and-take, in each case, the Kansas 
                                                     
 29. See cases cited supra note 19. 
 30. Defendants’ [Diaz and Demalleo] Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Suppress 
Evidence, supra note 20, at *2 (after returning the occupants’ licenses and the car’s rental agreement 
and giving Diaz a warning for failure to maintain a lane, “Trooper Duffy began walking towards the 
back of the Chrysler, only to turn around and ask Mr. Diaz if he could ask a couple of questions”).  
See also United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL 2760798, at *3–4 (D. 
Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (explaining that Trooper issued driver a written warning for failing to maintain 
a lane and for a registration violation, returned the driver’s paperwork, and said “‘No ticket.  Just a 
warning.  Thank you.’”  Then, officer walked to the rear of the vehicle, returned to the passenger 
window, and asked if “he could ask the men a few more questions”); United States v. Jose 
Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1181 (D. Kan. 2009) (officers returned Maldonado’s license and 
insurance, told him to continue on his way, and then “re-engaged” him to ask more questions about 
his travel and to ask for consent to search the vehicle); United States v. Perales, No. 08-40055-JAR, 
2008 WL 4974807, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2008) (“Trooper Henderson explained that he did not 
intend to give defendant a citation; rather he wanted assurance that defendant was not impaired” and 
after “returning defendant’s documents” Trooper Henderson “walked to the rear of the Toyota 
before returning to ask defendant if he had any illegal drugs in the vehicle”); United States v. Rocha, 
No. 06-40057-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (noting that the deputy 
returned all of the occupants’ documents and gave the driver a warning ticket for failing to maintain 
a single lane of travel before telling the driver “thank you” and stepping aside before returning to ask 
whether the driver “had any drugs or contraband”). 
 31. Presumably, the officers ended the stop by returning the documents and telling the 
occupants they were free to leave because a seizure that is lawful at its inception may become 
unconstitutional (in violation of the Fourth Amendment) if its duration exceeds a reasonable time 
needed to investigate the basis for the stop.  See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1968); see also United States v. Chavira, 467 F.3d 1286, 1290 
(10th Cir. 2006) (a seizure justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket can become 
unlawful if prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission, so a driver must 
be permitted to leave after a routine traffic stop unless an officer has reasonable suspicion or the 
driver consents to further questioning). 
 32. See Gonzalo Maldonado, 2009 WL 2760798, at *4. 
 33. Rocha, 2008 WL 4498950, at *2. 
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officer sought to search the vehicles.34  In three of the cases, there was 
some question about the ability of the car’s occupants to understand 
English.35 
Taking the fog-line cases as a whole, the officers’ issuance of 
warnings rather than tickets appears designed to take advantage of 
human nature.36  A warning causes the driver to relax and to feel grateful 
to the officer.  Sensing an opportunity to circumvent the need for 
probable cause, the officer then asks the driver for consent.37  The driver, 
now feeling like he owes the officer something in return for the simple 
warning, agrees to the search.  Especially in cases involving people 
whose first language is not English, the colloquy seems destined to end 
in a search, regardless of whether voluntary and knowing consent is 
given.38 
The officers’ intent to conduct a search is, perhaps, best illustrated in 
the one case (of the five) that occupants refused to continue to answer the 
officer’s questions and never consented to a search.  In United States v. 
                                                     
 34. In four cases the officer asked for permission to search.  In the fifth case, the defendant 
began to drive away before the officer could ask. 
 35. In the case of defendant Felipe J. Perales, the district court noted that the defendant 
answered the trooper’s questions about drugs “without difficulty communicating.”  Perales, 2008 
WL 4974807, at *2.  In the case of Jose Maldonado, the court noted that the defendant’s silence in 
the face of police questioning may have been due to “his limited knowledge of the English 
language.”  Jose Maldonado, F. Supp. 2d at 1183.  And, in the case of Gonzalo Maldonado and 
Manuel Garcia, the officer was told by the passenger that the driver “did not communicate very well 
in English.”  Gonzalo Maldonado, 2009 WL 2760798, at *1. 
 36. In Kansas officers have extensive discretion in determining whether to issue a citation or 
just a warning.  It is unclear in what percentage of traffic stops officers decide on the warning.  In an 
extensive study of traffic enforcement in Kansas published in 2003, the researchers indicated that 
there was no uniform policy for collecting and maintaining data about tickets versus warnings.  See 
A Multijurisdictional Assessment, supra note 23, at 12.  The study noted that New Jersey and 
Arizona showed high percentages of warnings.  Id. at 13 (reporting that Arizona police issue 
warnings in 75% of stops and that in New Jersey the percentage is approximately 63%).  Data 
collected by the Wichita Police Department for the period January 1, 2001 through June 30, 2001 
(including police stops of both cars and pedestrians) revealed that “[m]ost stops result in the issuance 
of a citation.”  WITHROW, supra note 28, at Executive Summary. 
 37. Studies have shown that people are likely to comply with requests from authority figures 
and that people feel pressure when dealing with police officers.  See David K. Kessler, Free to 
Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 51, 63–64 (2009) (reviewing some of these studies and reporting results of his own 
empirical findings). 
 38. The fact that an officer requested permission to search in four of the five fog-line cases is 
notable because officers do not ask to search during every traffic stop.  For instance, data collected 
in 2000 from the Wichita Police Department indicated that their officers conducted searches in only 
about 12.5% of car stops and that many of these searches were justified as incident to the arrest of 
the car’s occupants.  WITHROW, supra note 28, at Executive Summary.  The Wichita study also 
revealed that while Wichita Police did not stop a disproportionate number of Hispanic drivers, both 
black and Hispanic citizens were more likely to be searched than were non-black and non-Hispanic 
persons.  Id. 
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Diaz, an officer stopped a Chrysler, reporting that the car crossed over 
the center line by at least six inches, at least twice.39  After checking the 
driver’s and passengers’ paperwork, the officer returned the documents 
and issued a warning for the infractions.40  Then, the officer “took a 
couple of steps back towards his patrol car and heard the gear selector 
shift.”41  Hearing the driver begin to leave, the officer asked “if he could 
ask some more questions[,]” but the driver refused, saying “we’re 
done.”42  Intent on searching the car, the officer ordered the driver to 
“take the keys out of the ignition, hand them over . . . and put the car in 
park.”43  The officer then called another officer to bring a drug dog to the 
scene to sniff for drugs.44 
In other words, in all five of the fog-line cases, the officers appeared 
to be looking for drugs without probable cause to believe that drugs 
would be present in these particular vehicles.45  Sometimes it took more 
than one search.46  Sometimes it took an extended period of time.47  
Sometimes officers searched despite the defendant’s refusal to consent,48 
but officers eventually found illegal drugs in each of the five vehicles.49 
In two of the five fog-line cases, the defendants later succeeded in 
excluding the contraband from use at trial.  The trial judge suppressed 
                                                     
 39. No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 5, 2008). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Racial and ethnicity profiling is a nationwide concern.  See Timothy P. O’Neill, Vagrants 
In Volvos: Ending Pretextual Traffic Stops and Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 745, 747, 771–72 (2009) (reciting literature and studies of “disturbing racial disparities in 
traffic enforcement” including study of stops throughout Illinois in which officers “utilized consent 
searches against Hispanic drivers more than twice as often as against Caucasian drivers” although 
“searches of Caucasians were twice as likely to discover contraband as were the searches of 
minorities”). 
 46. See Transcript of Proceedings (Feb. 26, 2009), 22 & Transcript of Proceedings (Mar. 12, 
2009), 26–30, United States v. Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2009) (No. 08-
10216-01) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings] (on file with author) (three officers worked two 
different drug dogs on the vehicle until one of the dogs finally alerted to drugs; one police report was 
altered, making it appear that it took fewer than three searches to find drugs). 
 47. Id.  See also United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL 2760798, 
at *3–4 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (explaining how trooper searched car for about ten minutes, 
including its front and back seats, trunk and undercarriage and then asked the two defendants to 
follow him to a place where he could look under the car, which was about fifteen miles from the 
place of the stop). 
 48. See United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1 (after officers 
returned occupants’ documents and indicated defendants could leave, officer directed driver to put 
the car in park and step out). 
 49. Of course, these cases provide no insight into the number of cars with Hispanic occupants 
that were searched but revealed no contraband. 
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the evidence after finding that the officers violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights on the way to uncovering the evidence.  In 
Diaz, the judge granted the defendants’50 joint motion to suppress crystal 
methamphetamine and other drug-related evidence.51  Although the judge 
determined that the initial stop was legally justified by the fog-line 
violation, he also ruled that after the officer issued the defendants a 
warning citation, “Diaz did not agree to further questioning and was 
ordered [without reasonable cause] to put the car in park and surrender 
the keys.”52  Because the additional questioning and continued seizure of 
car and occupants was neither consensual nor supported by reasonable 
suspicion, the Kansas officer violated the Fourth Amendment by 
continuing to detain the car so that he could subject it to a drug-dog sniff 
and subsequent search. 
In United States v. Jose Maldonado, another district court judge 
granted the defendant’s motion to suppress methamphetamine and 
cocaine.53  At the hearing on the motion, officers claimed that they 
stopped Maldonado because he committed a lane violation.  The judge 
suppressed the evidence after finding that one officer’s testimony was 
not credible.  The judge explained: 
The government argues that the officers had probable cause to stop the 
vehicle because the left side tires of Maldonado’s vehicle drifted over 
the center line on at least one occasion, and he was weaving within his 
own lane.  However, prior to the alleged drifting of Maldonado’s 
vehicle, Officer Cooper testified that the only reason he initially 
followed Maldonado was because he had a Texas license plate.  Indeed, 
he was parked on an exit ramp and pulled onto the roadway for that 
reason alone.  And, this is the only portion of Officer Cooper’s 
testimony that the court finds credible.54 
This Article applauds the judges’ rulings and seeks to show why 
Kansas trial judges are right to scrutinize fog-line and similar traffic 
stops carefully and to suppress evidence whenever they doubt officers’ 
testimony about the circumstances of a stop or the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness of other police behavior.  Whether the officers’ pretextual 
                                                     
 50. Defendants were driver and occupant of the car.  Id. 
 51. Id. at *3. 
 52. Id. at *2. 
 53. 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (D. Kan. 2009). 
 54. Id. at 1182.  But see United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL 
2760798, at *1–2 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that officer acted in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment in following vehicle, which was traveling from California, for 
two to three minutes before witnessing a fog-line violation, noting that officer did not need 
reasonable suspicion to follow the car). 
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stops are based on actual or phantom violations, the data suggests that 
Kansas officers are relying on these infractions to stop a disproportionate 
number of Hispanic drivers of out-of-state cars. 
B. The Deceptively Attractive Nature of Fog-line Violations 
While in five of nine traffic stops, officers cited a fog-line violation 
as the reason for the stop,55 fog-line stops were much more likely to 
result in the suppression of evidence than were other traffic infractions or 
other cases based on traditional probable cause.  In the thirteen-month 
period studied, judges in the District of Kansas denied 29 of 35 (83%) of 
motions to suppress, thus allowing the introduction of contraband against 
the defendants in each of those cases.56  Of thirty-five motions, judges 
granted only three outright and granted, in part, another three.57  
Nevertheless, in fog-line cases, judges granted the defendants’ motions 
in two of five cases.58  In other words, despite the extensive leeway the 
law gives officers to make traffic stops for even the smallest traffic 
infraction,59 in 40% (two of five) of the federal cases in which Kansas 
police relied on a fog-line violation to justify such a stop, the District 
Court of Kansas ruled that officers had overreached and violated the 
federal Constitution in their vigor to uncover a more serious crime.60  In 
Fourth Amendment parlance, the officers acted “unreasonably.”  Thus, 
whether consciously or subconsciously, Kansas federal district court 
judges expressed disfavor of fog-line cases through their rulings on 
motions to suppress evidence. 
Unless officers are aware that fog-line cases have met with 
successful motions to suppress a disproportionately large percentage of 
the time, “fog-line testimony” might seem to be an ideal justification for 
a stop.  When the driver of a car violates a traffic law, even a very minor 
one, the violation gives the police reasonable grounds to “seize” the 
car.61  A legal stop gives the officer an opportunity to look in and smell 
                                                     
 55. See supra note 19 (citing nine District of Kansas cases involving traffic stops). 
 56. See Appendix infra (citing thirty-five motions, twenty-nine of which were denied). 
 57. See Appendix infra (citing thirty-five motions, three of which were granted outright, and 
another three which were granted in part). 
 58. See Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (granting the defendants’ motion to 
suppress); United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 5, 
2008) (granting defendants’ motion to suppress). 
 59. See discussion infra at Part III. 
 60. See Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1183–84; Diaz, 2008 WL 3154664 at *2–3. 
 61. “Although a traffic stop is considered a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, a traffic 
infraction provides reasonable suspicion for a law enforcement officer to conduct the investigatory 
detention.”  State v. Tinoco, No. 100,435, 2009 WL 1591644, at *2, 208 P.3d 361 (Kan. Ct. App. 
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the vehicle’s interior and to get as close as a few inches from the car’s 
occupants.  A single fog-line violation provides the police with a chance 
to ask the occupants questions about their intended destination, their 
reasons for traveling, their plans upon arrival, and, importantly, whether 
they will agree to a search of their vehicle, purse, clothing, etc.  An 
added bonus, especially in Kansas, where it is often quite windy, is that 
everyone occasionally veers from his own lane of traffic.62  Thus, if the 
police wait long enough, they can often rely on a fog-line infraction as a 
legitimate reason to stop almost any car or driver.  Also, because there is 
no prohibition against following a car to observe it,63 it is conceivable 
that nervousness alone may effectively “force” many drivers, especially 
minorities and people who are generally fearful of police, to veer, at least 
a little, from their lane of travel when they normally would have no 
trouble maintaining a single lane. 
From a proof standpoint, a fog-line violation would seem to be ideal 
for the prosecution.  Such violations require no special evidence, no 
forensics or video proof.  Whereas speeding violations are typically 
accompanied by radar evidence, and driving under the influence 
violations are proven by breathalyzer or blood/alcohol proof, fog-line 
violations typically are established by the officer’s testimony alone.  
Even when an officer provides video to support the stop, the traffic 
violation is usually missing from the video.64  The officer often activates 
the camera by turning on his lights or siren, after the alleged infraction.  
Even tag violations and infractions for following too closely would 
probably be visible in the video, unlike lane drifts. 
                                                                                                                       
2009) (table decision) (citing City of Norton v. Wonderly, 172 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2007)).  See also State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601, 605 (Kan. 2009) (explaining that a “traffic violation 
provides an objectively valid reason to effectuate a traffic stop, even if the stop is pretextual”).  See 
also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1993), discussed infra at Part III.A. 
 62. At the hearing on Julian Rocha’s motion to suppress, the defendant called an expert witness 
who testified that when winds reach forty-five miles per hour, “all vehicles would probably deviate 
from their lane.”  United States v. Rocha, No. 06-40057-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950, at *3 (D. Kan. 
Oct. 2, 2008).  See also Emily Van Zandt & Karen Dillon, Study finds slowdown in Kansas wind 
speed, KAN. CITY STAR, Jul. 20, 2009, at A4 (quoting Mary Knapp, Kansas state climatologist as 
saying that Kansas is the “third-windiest state in the U.S.” and indicating that wind speeds average 
eleven to twelve miles per hour, but in 2009 meteorologists recorded a gust of 120 miles per hour 
and another gust of ninety miles per hour that lasted one minute). 
 63. Following a car or individual is not a search or seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
 64. For instance, in the case of Julian Rocha, the officer’s car was equipped with a video 
camera but none of the three alleged fog-line violations was captured on the video, supposedly 
because the video was turned on only after the traffic violations, when the officer activated the 
emergency lights on the police car.  Nevertheless, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the video 
actually began when the RV was already stopped.  Rocha, 2008 WL 4498950, at *2.  Nevertheless, 
the judge deemed the evidence sufficient to deny the defendant’s motion to suppress.  Id. at *6. 
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The lack of tangible evidence of fog-line infraction makes them 
uniquely difficult to refute.  An officer’s word would appear to be more 
than adequate to establish reasonable suspicion by the applicable 
preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof.65  Because most of 
Kansas is flat and breezy, it is easy to believe that a car left its lane of 
travel, even if it did not.  A defendant who contradicts an officer’s 
testimony with a claim that he or she did not cross the fog line does little 
more than generate images of childhood disputes—”Yes, you did.  No, I 
did not.  Yes, you did!”  When there is no independent evidence to 
contradict an officer’s sworn testimony,66 there is no reason for the judge 
to doubt the officer’s credibility, especially considering that the judge 
now knows that contraband was found in the car (or on the defendant) 
and that application of the exclusionary rule will, in all likelihood, doom 
the government’s case.67  Particularly for defendants facing serious 
charges, their inherently-biased testimony is highly unlikely to overcome 
an officer’s version of events. 
Because fog-line violations are easy to believe and difficult to refute, 
unscrupulous officers might be tempted to adopt them as a favorite 
explanation for traffic stops, particularly when they do not have other 
reasonable grounds to believe that the car’s occupants are committing a 
crime.  Even if Kansas police do not distort the truth, claiming phantom 
fog-line violations, officers appear to pre-select certain drivers and then 
use fog-line infractions to justify pretextual drug investigations. 
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW 
Supreme Court precedent and evolving law in both the Tenth Circuit 
and the state courts of Kansas encourage officers to rely on fog-line 
violations as grounds to subject a car to a traffic stop.  The United States 
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have given police extensive 
discretion to conduct pretextual stops for all types of traffic infractions, 
and the Tenth Circuit and Kansas appellate courts permit officers to 
prove fog-line infractions with cursory testimony. 
                                                     
 65. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974) (describing government’s burden of 
proof in motions to suppress as preponderance of the evidence). 
 66. Typically, the only witnesses to the traffic stop and subsequent search will be the police and 
the occupants of the car. 
 67. In both fog-line cases in which the court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, the 
government later dismissed the case, presumably because evidence was lacking to proceed to trial. 
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A. United States Supreme Court Precedent 
The Supreme Court’s holdings in Delaware v. Prouse68 and Whren v. 
United States69 inform any discussion of whether police have acted 
legally when “seizing” a car or truck in a traffic stop and subsequently 
subjecting both vehicle and occupants to an investigation, related or 
unrelated to the officer’s purported reason for the stop.70  In Prouse, the 
Court declared it “unreasonable,” and therefore a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment,71 for a police officer to seize a car without probable cause 
or reasonable suspicion to believe “that the car is being driven contrary 
to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either the 
car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection 
with the violation of any other applicable law.”72  The officer in Prouse 
violated the Fourth Amendment because he stopped a car without 
observing any traffic or equipment violation or any other suspicious 
activity.73  The stop was held to be an unconstitutional intrusion on 
Fourth Amendment freedoms after the officer forthrightly admitted that 
he “saw the car in the area and wasn’t answering any complaints,” so he 
chose to stop the car.74 
The mandate of the Prouse decision was clear.  In the run-of-the-mill 
case,75 police need “at least articulable and reasonable suspicion” that the 
driver or occupants of the car are violating a law before they can legally 
conduct a stop.76  Unbridled police discretion to stop any car, at any time, 
even in the interest of public safety, is a breach of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court later explained Prouse: “The officer’s  
 
                                                     
 68. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
 69. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 70. In Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007), the Court held that a passenger in a 
car, as well as the driver of the vehicle, is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when a 
police officer conducts a traffic stop.  Prouse had made clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure 
occurs when a car is stopped and its occupants are detained, even if the stop “is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief.”  440 U.S. at 653. 
 71. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. iv (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”); 
see also KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15 (prohibiting unreasonable government searches and 
seizures). 
 72. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 650–51. 
 75. Id. at 657, 663 (expressly distinguishing suspicionless stops of vehicles at roadblocks 
“where all vehicles are brought to a halt”). 
 76. Id. at 663. 
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conduct in that case was unconstitutional primarily on account of his 
exercise of ‘standardless and unconstrained discretion.’”77 
The impact of the Prouse decision was marginalized twenty-five 
years later, when the Supreme Court unanimously decided Whren v. 
United States.78  In Whren, the Court held that the subjective intentions 
of an officer in conducting a Fourth Amendment seizure “play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”79 
The defendants in Whren had argued that civil traffic regulations 
should be treated differently than instances in which probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion rests on other, more significant grounds.  They 
contended: 
[T]he use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total 
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police 
officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a 
technical violation.  This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a 
means of investigating other law violations, as to which no probable 
cause or even articulable suspicion exists.80 
The Court rejected this argument and confirmed that breach of a simple 
traffic regulation can provide an officer with reasonable grounds for a 
stop, regardless of the real motives of the police for choosing a particular 
car.81  After Whren, police still need an articulable and reasonable basis 
to conduct a traffic stop, but any “civil traffic violation” can suffice to 
create that reason.82  It is legally irrelevant that an officer uses a traffic 
violation to investigate his or her hollow hunches that a driver is 
committing a more serious offense, such as drug trafficking.83  Thus, 
reading Prouse with Whren illustrates that while a police officer cannot 
stop every car she chooses just because she has a “feeling” that a stop 
will expose a crime, she is authorized to seize a car and its passengers 
any time the officer sees a traffic violation or has other reasonable 
grounds to believe that the car violated a rule of the road.84 
                                                     
 77. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000). 
 78. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 79. Id. at 813. 
 80. Id. at 810. 
 81. Id. at 813. 
 82. Id. at 808. 
 83. Id. at 811–12. 
 84. See also United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (providing the 
Tenth Circuit’s version of this standard: “[A] traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
at its inception if the officer has either (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has 
occurred . . . or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that ‘this particular motorist violated any one 
of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction’” (citation 
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After Whren, reasonable grounds for a traffic stop are lacking only 
when there is no traffic violation and no other reasonable basis to believe 
that a crime is being committed.  Of course, if an officer falsely claims to 
see a violation when she does not, there is no reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause for a stop.85 
B. Tenth Circuit Precedent 
The Tenth Circuit’s version of Whren and its application of fog-line 
statutes in states within the circuit encourage Kansas police to cite lane 
drifts as grounds for a traffic stop. 
1. The Tenth Circuit’s Version of Whren 
For about a decade before the decision in Whren, Tenth Circuit86 
precedent protected citizens against pretextual government searches and 
seizures.  Noting that pretextual stops “permit arbitrary intrusions 
[risking that] thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic 
regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom 
to stop,” the Tenth Circuit declared that pretextual stops by individual 
officers were “unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”87  While recognizing that “requiring at least a minor traffic 
offense” provides “some objective limitation on police intrusions,” the 
Tenth Circuit, at that time, found such limits too meager.88  Instead, the 
court evaluated pretextual stops by asking “whether under the same 
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the 
absence of the invalid purpose.”89  If a reasonable officer would have 
been uninterested in pursuing the traffic violation absent the hope of 
finding drugs, other contraband, or some other serious violation of law, 
then the seizure and search were deemed unconstitutional.90 
                                                                                                                       
omitted)). 
 85. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (acknowledging that if an officer 
“really had not seen” a traffic violation, then there is no pretext for the stop but also no probable 
cause for it). 
 86. The Tenth Circuit includes: Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming. 
 87. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 88. Id. at 1516. 
 89. Id. at 1517 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 90. Id. 
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In 1995, even before the Supreme Court decided Whren, the Tenth 
Circuit changed its position.  In an en banc decision, the court in United 
States v. Botero-Ospina, “adopt[ed] a new test” for “determining when 
an initial stop of an automobile violates the Fourth Amendment.”91  
Pursuant to the new standard, “a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the 
police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or 
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring.”92  The new rule made 
it “irrelevant” that an officer held a subjectively improper motive in 
addition to an objectively valid basis for a stop.93  The Tenth Circuit said: 
“Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable 
suspicion that this particular motorist violated ‘any one of the multitude 
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations’ of the jurisdiction.”94 
The Tenth Circuit insisted that despite the change in position, 
citizens were adequately protected against arbitrary police intrusion on 
privacy and liberty because “if an officer’s initial traffic stop, though 
objectively justified by the officer’s observation of a minor traffic 
violation, is motivated by a desire to engage in an investigation of more 
serious criminal activity, his investigation . . . will be circumscribed by 
Terry [v. Ohio]’s scope requirement.”95  In Terry, the Supreme Court 
held that a stop, which is reasonable at its inception, may violate the 
Fourth Amendment “by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope.”96 
2. The Tenth Circuit’s Fog-line Cases 
While the Whren and Botero-Ospina decisions make any violation of 
the rules of the road an acceptable basis for a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, other decisions from the Tenth Circuit make a fog-line infraction 
a particularly attractive excuse for an investigatory stop.  The Tenth 
Circuit has interpreted Kansas’s traffic laws97 in a way that allows police 
                                                     
 91. 71 F.3d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 92. Id. at 787. 
 93. Id.  Apparently a majority of the Tenth Circuit abandoned the old Guzman test, finding it 
“unworkable” because of disparate application of the standard by the district courts and because in 
the court’s view, it interfered with principles of federalism.  See Leary & Rae, supra note 7, at 1017 
(critiquing the Botero-Ospina decision). 
 94. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)). 
 95. Id. at 788.  In Terry, the Supreme Court held that police are authorized to seize a person for 
a limited time based on specific and articulable suspicion to believe that crime is afoot and that 
officers can conduct an accompanying limited search of the person’s outer clothing if there is reason 
to believe that the person is armed and dangerous.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 96. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18–19. 
 97. The same is true of the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of similarly-worded statutes from 
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to stop cars for lane violations that are physically unavoidable, present no 
hazard to others, and even when the violations are committed in the 
interest of promoting driver safety.  Piecing together various decisions 
from the Tenth Circuit, it seems that a Kansas officer may stop a car 
even if the car leaves its lane of traffic only once for a brief time. 
In United States v. Tang, the Tenth Circuit held that a single, but 
significant, fog-line violation by the driver of a U-Haul was sufficient 
reason for an officer to stop the U-Haul.98  The stop in Tang occurred 
around 10:00 p.m.99  It was a dark night, on a stretch of road with no 
street lights or moonlight.100  There was a “mild to moderate wind.”101  
At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he saw the 
defendant’s U-Haul “cross over the right side fog line” and remain there 
for two hundred to three hundred yards.102  After the lane drift, the 
officer followed the U-Haul another mile, but the U-Haul did not leave 
its lane again.103  Despite the isolated lane violation and the mile with no 
other infractions, the officer stopped the U-Haul.104  In testimony, the 
officer admitted that “it is common for people to drive over the line on 
the freeway,” but said that this violation was different because of “the 
time of night and length of time [defendant]’s vehicle was over the fog 
line.”105  The trial judge found that the officer testified “credibly and 
truthfully” and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.106  On appeal, 
the Tenth Circuit ruled that because there were no unusual weather or 
road conditions that made it impractical to remain entirely within a single 
lane of traffic, the officer acted lawfully in stopping the U-Haul.107  In 
                                                                                                                       
other states, for example Utah’s “fog-line” statute.  See, e.g., United States v. Tang, No. 08-4179, 
2009 WL 1353755 (10th Cir. May 15, 2009) (holding that stopping a vehicle for a fog-line violation 
was proper despite the absence of hazard to others). 
 98. Id. at *6.  Tang interpreted Utah’s statute, not Kansas’s, but the statutory language in each 
statute is very similar, and the Tenth Circuit’s decisions have treated the statutes similarly.  Utah’s 
statute requires a “person operating a vehicle” to “keep the vehicle as nearly as practical entirely 
within a single lane.”  UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-710(1)(a) (West 2004).  Kansas’s statute requires a 
“vehicle” to be driven “as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-
1522(a) (2008). 
 99. Tang, 2009 WL 1353755, at *1. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *2. 
 106. Id. at *3. 
 107. Id. at *4 (distinguishing United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996), in which 
the Tenth Circuit found unreasonable an officer’s decision to conduct a traffic stop after a truck 
briefly crossed onto the right shoulder emergency lane, given that the terrain was mountainous, the 
weather was windy, and the road winding).  See also United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 
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Fourth Amendment terms, the stop was “reasonable,” so it complied with 
the Constitution. 
In United States v. Alvarado, the Tenth Circuit increased the 
attractiveness of fog-line violations as a basis for a traffic stop, ruling 
that one incident of driving across the fog line by “about a foot” for “a 
few seconds” gave the police sufficient reason to stop the car.108  In 
Alvarado, a Utah109 Highway Patrol Trooper testified that a Jeep 
Cherokee crossed about one foot over the right fog line of the highway 
and remained there for a few seconds despite “ideal driving conditions,” 
including a sunny day, no wind, and a straight and flat stretch of road, 
which was dry and without pot holes or debris.110  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that “there were no adverse weather 
or road conditions that might have made it impractical for Alvarado to 
prevent his vehicle from drifting out of the righthand lane and over the 
fog line.”111  On its way to concluding that the trooper “had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Alvarado, by crossing one foot over the fog 
line, had violated [Utah’s] § 41-6-61(1),”112 the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s argument that a typical driver “‘operating a motor vehicle at 
or near interstate speed limits has a difficult task of operating the vehicle 
entirely within a single lane for the entirety of his trip.’”113  In rejecting 
the defendant’s argument, the Tenth Circuit explained that under its 
precedent, the determination is “a fact-specific inquiry into the particular 
circumstances present during the incident in question in order to 
determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a 
straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway.”114 
Consistent with its ruling that a single violation of a fog-line statute 
can create reasonable suspicion or probable cause sufficient to subject a 
                                                                                                                       
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding that reasonable grounds for a traffic stop existed when an officer saw a 
truck swerve onto the shoulder of the road and almost hit a bridge abutment). 
 108. 430 F.3d 1305, 1306 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 109. As noted earlier, the Kansas statute and the Utah statute contain similar wording.  In any 
event, the Tenth Circuit has often applied its precedent involving fog-line violations in one state to a 
fog-line violation in another.  See United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, 311 F. App’x 140, 143 (10th Cir. 
2009) (noting in the context of an evaluation of whether a fog-line violation that occurred in Kansas 
gave the police reasonable suspicion, that the “factual situation of the initial stop resembles instances 
in which we have found a violation of the Kansas statute or similar laws of other states” (emphasis 
added)). 
 110. Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1306–07. 
 111. Id. at 1309. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (quoting defendant’s argument in support of motion to suppress). 
 114. Id.  The Tenth Circuit has also held that one abrupt swerve across the fog line lasting “about 
two seconds on the shoulder” is sufficient grounds for a stop.  Pulido-Vasquez, 311 F. App’x at 142, 
144. 
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driver and her car to a Fourth Amendment seizure, the Tenth Circuit’s 
cases establish that two fog-line violations are usually more than enough 
reason for a traffic stop, even if a driver is operating a large vehicle, like 
a motor home, which is susceptible to being blown off course by wind.  
In United States v. Ozbirn, the Tenth Circuit agreed that reasonable 
suspicion was created when a motor home driven on a Kansas highway 
drifted onto the shoulder of the road “twice within a quarter mile under 
optimal road, weather and traffic conditions.”115  The defendant did not 
dispute the facts but contended that “drifting outside the marked lane 
does not establish sufficient grounds for an officer to make a stop.”116  
Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Kansas fog-line 
statute was “susceptible to rather arbitrary application by law 
enforcement officers,” the court decided that on the particular facts of the 
case, the trooper “had probable cause to stop Mr. Ozbirn.”117 
As the Tenth Circuit acknowledged, fog-line violations offer the 
police extensive discretion to enforce the traffic laws arbitrarily.118  Not 
only is every driver certain to violate a single-lane requirement on 
occasion,119 but especially in Kansas, which often experiences windy 
conditions, it may sometimes be physically impossible to drive entirely 
within a single lane.120  Moreover, because an officer’s assertion that 
such a violation occurred is difficult, if not impossible, for a driver to 
refute with his own competing testimony, traffic stops for fog-line 
violations give the police infinite opportunities to pick and choose which 
drivers and cars they will stop.  It appears that any thoughtful officer 
could follow a car long enough to spot a fog-line violation, or convince 
herself that the car and driver seem suspicious and that the officer would 
be justified in claiming such an infraction. 
Some of the proof that police can and do pick and choose among 
drivers when they decide to enforce a fog-line statute is supported by the 
facts of the Tenth Circuit cases reporting such violations.  In case after 
case, an officer stops a vehicle for drifting from its lane of traffic, but 
rather than ticket the driver or undertake an investigation directed at 
                                                     
 115. 189 F.3d 1194, 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 116. Id. at 1198. 
 117. Id.  In the alternative, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of a 
traffic violation to warrant a traffic stop for further investigation.  Id. at 1199. 
 118. Id. at 1198. 
 119. As the officer admitted in the Tang case, it is common for drivers to drift from their own 
lane of travel, at least occasionally.  United States v. Tang, 332 F. App’x 446, 448 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 120. See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 900 
(1994) (evaluating car accidents from an economics perspective and noting that “[i]t is impossible to 
drive a car for any period of time without missing a required precaution”). 
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ensuring that the driver is not falling asleep or otherwise incapable of 
maintaining her lane, the officer embarks on an obvious attempt to 
investigate the driver and car for drug violations or other, similarly 
serious crimes.  In case after case, the police offer the driver a warning 
before momentarily leaving the driver and then “reconnecting” to ask 
more questions and, ultimately, requesting permission to search for 
contraband.  Typically, the nature and subject matter of the officer’s 
questions show that the officer cares nothing about a lane violation and 
everything about possible drug trafficking. 
For example, in United States v. Gregory, an officer testified that the 
defendant was not cited for a traffic violation but that during his 
interaction with the driver, he became suspicious that the vehicle 
contained contraband; therefore, the officer asked if the defendant was 
“carrying any illegal substances in the truck” and then “if he could take a 
look.”121  Ultimately, a search of the defendant’s rented U-Haul 
uncovered marijuana and cocaine in plastic garbage bags in the trailer 
portion of the truck.122  In United States v. Alvarado, the trooper “gave 
Alvarado a written warning for crossing the fog line, returned Alvarado’s 
documents, and told him ‘you’re free to leave, drive safely,’” before 
returning to the defendant’s vehicle and asking the driver more questions 
and “for permission to search the vehicle.”123  The subsequent search of 
the defendant’s Jeep revealed “illegal narcotics hidden in the rear.”124  In 
United States v. Ozbirn, the trooper “finished issuing [a] warning” and 
then “asked Mr. Ozbirn if he could ask him a few more questions.”125  
This colloquy was followed by an inquiry about whether the defendant 
was “hauling any illegal guns, drugs, weapons, or other contraband,” 
after which Mr. Ozbirn reportedly “invited” the trooper to look inside his 
motor home.126  Packets of marijuana were eventually discovered.127  In 
United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, it was a similar story.128  A Kansas 
highway patrol trooper issued the driver a warning, returned his 
“documentation,” told the driver he was free to go, and then asked the 
driver and the passenger “for permission to search the vehicle for 
drugs.”129  Likewise, in United States v. Egan, a Shawnee County Kansas 
                                                     
 121. 79 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 122. Id. at 977. 
 123. 430 F.3d 1305, 1307 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 124. Id. 
 125. 189 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1197. 
 128. 311 F. App’x 140, 142 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 129. Id. 
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Sheriff’s Deputy stopped a “‘box-type’ rental moving truck” for failing 
to maintain a single lane of traffic.130  Then, the deputy returned the 
driver’s license and rental truck agreement, gave her a warning, and told 
her she was free to leave.131  Immediately thereafter, the deputy “asked if 
he could ask a few more questions” and then gained permission to look 
in the truck.132  A subsequent search of the moving truck led officers to 
find “twenty bundles of marijuana.”133 
The fact that fog-line cases regularly involve an officer’s transparent 
attempt to move quickly from discussing the traffic infraction to a search 
of the vehicle or occupants for drugs, guns, or other criminal violations 
strongly suggests, at least circumstantially, that police select certain cars 
and drivers as a pretext to investigate those cars and their occupants, not 
for fog-line violations, as they claim, but for more serious crimes for 
which the police lack any reasonable grounds to stop or search the car.  
Because in case after case, the police issue no citation for fog-line 
infractions, which supposedly prompted the stops, it seems unlikely that 
police view such violations as significant.  In addition, because in each 
stop, the police seek permission to search after quickly dismissing the 
fog-line citation, the real motivation appears to be the search, not the 
ticket or the safety concern regarding the driver’s failure to maintain a 
lane. 
C. Kansas State Law 
In Kansas, K.S.A. section 8-1522 is the “fog-line statute,” 
prohibiting drivers from committing lane violations.  It provides that 
when a roadway is divided into two clearly marked lanes of traffic, “[a] 
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single 
lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first 
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.”134  In the past 
two years, the Kansas Court of Appeals struggled to find a unified 
position regarding the type of conduct that creates reasonable suspicion 
or probable cause to believe that section 8-1522(a) has been breached.  
As discussed below in part C.2., the Kansas Supreme Court recently 
resolved the tension within the Kansas Court of Appeals.  Nevertheless, 
the history of the appellate decisions showcases why Kansas officers 
                                                     
 130. 256 F. App’x 191, 193 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 131. Id. at 193. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 192–93. 
 134. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1522(a) (2008). 
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would choose fog-line violations as a pretext to investigate a hunch about 
more substantial crimes. 
1. The Kansas Court of Appeals 
One line of cases from the Court of Appeals required a fog-line 
violation, plus a determination that a lane drift was unsafe.  A second 
competing line of cases from the same court rejected the need for a 
finding of dangerousness.  In State v. Ross, a three-judge panel of the 
Court of Appeals held that the “as nearly as practicable” language in the 
traffic statute precluded an officer from conducting a traffic stop when 
she observes a driver cross the fog line only once during two miles of 
observation.135  Judges McAnany, Pierron, and Bukaty all agreed that the 
defendant’s failure to maintain a single lane of traffic “[did] not 
necessarily constitute a violation of K.S.A. 8-1522(a).”136  The panel 
explained further: “‘As nearly as practicable’ connotes something less 
than the absolute.  Automobiles are not railway locomotives.  They do 
not run on fixed rails.”137  The panel said that cars are permitted to move 
from a single lane “after first determining it is safe to do so.”138  The 
panel concluded that whether reasonable suspicion exists for a traffic 
stop turns on whether “the totality of the circumstances . . . make it 
appear to the officer that not only did the defendant’s vehicle move from 
its lane of travel, but it left its lane when it was not safe to do so.”139  
Applying the facts to its announced interpretation of section 8-1522(a), 
the panel in Ross decided that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for 
a stop.140 
There was no testimony that there was any obstacle or barrier on the 
shoulder that presented an immediate danger.  There was no testimony 
that sand, gravel, or debris on the shoulder presented a hazard to a 
motorist who directed his or her vehicle onto the shoulder.  There was 
not testimony that [the officer] was concerned that the driver might 
have been falling asleep or was intoxicated.  [The driver’s] vehicle was 
not weaving back and forth on the roadway.  He was not using the 
paved shoulder as a regular lane of travel.  He crossed the fog line only 
                                                     
 135. State v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876, 878–80 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007). 
 136. Id. at 879. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Although the Court of Appeals ultimately found that the officer lacked probable cause to 
stop the defendant’s car, the stop proved successful in uncovering contraband and illegality.  The 
defendant lacked a valid driver’s license and was concealing cocaine in his pockets.  Id. at 878. 
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briefly, for only a short distance, and only once.  In short, there was no 
reasonable suspicion that [the driver] was engaged in the conduct that is 
at the heart of the statute: moving a vehicle from its lane of travel 
without first ascertaining that it could be done safely.141 
Less than a year after the decision in Ross, a different three-judge 
panel (consisting of Judges Greene, Malone, and Leben) interpreted the 
same statute in a contrary way, expressly “declin[ing] to follow the Ross 
court’s interpretation.”142  In State v. Marx, the government appealed 
from the trial court’s ruling granting the defendants’ motions to 
suppress.143  A sheriff’s deputy had relied on K.S.A. section 8-1522 in 
stopping the defendants’ motor home for failure to maintain a single 
lane.144  The officer said he stopped the vehicle “after he saw it cross the 
fog line, overcorrect, and cross the centerline.”145  After the stop, the 
deputy obtained and checked the occupants’ licenses and vehicle 
registration, confirmed they were valid, and handed the documentation 
and a warning ticket to the occupants before telling the driver that she 
“was free to leave.”146  The deputy then asked the driver if she would 
answer a few more questions, asked if the motor home concealed drugs, 
and asked for permission to search it.147  When the driver refused 
consent, the deputy told her that he intended to use a drug dog to sniff the 
exterior of the vehicle.148  The driver then entered the motor home 
against the directives of the deputy and, apparently, began disposing of 
illegal drugs in the home’s septic tank.149 
The appellate panel in Marx found ample reasonable suspicion for 
the initial stop.  In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly declined 
to follow the Ross court’s interpretation of section 8-1522(a), explaining: 
“The ‘nearly as practicable’ language allows a driver to momentarily 
move outside a lane of traffic due to special circumstances such as 
weather conditions or an obstacle in the road.  Otherwise, the driver must 
                                                     
 141. Id. at 880.  In State v. Hawk, a panel comprised of Judges McAnany, Pierron, and 
Standridge characterized the holding in Ross this way: “Under Ross, an officer does not have 
reasonable suspicion that K.S.A. 8-1522 has been violated unless the totality of the circumstances 
makes it appear that the defendant moved his or her vehicle from its lane of travel when it was not 
safe to do so.”  State v. Hawk, No. 100,096, 2009 WL 744362, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2009). 
 142. State v. Marx, 171 P.3d 276, 283 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 215 
P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009). 
 143. Id. at 278. 
 144. Id. at 278–79. 
 145. Id. at 279. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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stay in one lane.”150  As for who must establish the “special 
circumstances” causing the car to drift, the panel said: “[I]f there was a 
special circumstance such as an obstacle in the road which caused [the 
driver] to swerve the motor home, it would seem that this is evidence 
only she could provide.  The State is not required to prove a negative.”151 
The panel in Marx was unwilling to uphold the trial court’s decision 
to grant the motion to suppress, even if there had been special 
circumstances requiring a safe driver to leave her lane of traffic.  
According to the panel, “[E]ven if [the driver] subsequently provided a 
legitimate defense for moving from her lane of traffic, such as to avoid 
an obstacle in the road, this would not invalidate the stop as long as [the 
officer] reasonably believed in good faith that a traffic violation had 
occurred.”152 
Combined, Ross and Marx demonstrate that when Marx was decided, 
six of the thirteen judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals were evenly 
divided on what it meant to commit a fog-line violation, which, in turn, 
gives an officer a legal basis to stop a car and conduct additional 
investigation in a face-to-face environment, offering police the chance to 
ask probing questions and for permission to search.  Three judges 
seemed to think almost any drift was enough; three others wanted to 
require a lane drift plus a safety inquiry. 
As a practical matter, the reasoning and holding in Ross made fog-
line violations significantly less attractive as a pretext to stop cars for 
ulterior reasons.  Following Ross, an officer could not just cite a minor 
lane drift to explain a stop; rather, she had to explain in a credible and 
logical way why there were reasonable grounds to think the driver acted 
unsafely.  This more detailed and extended testimony offered fodder for 
cross-examination of the officer.  If the officer’s narrative explanation 
was unconvincing, the judge might reject the officer’s testimony and 
suppress the evidence.  In contrast, under Marx, any reasonably 
competent officer could credibly articulate a lane drift as grounds for a 
traffic stop because no other explanation was needed.  Such a cursory 
and conclusory bit of testimony would be almost impossible to refute 
through cross-examination or otherwise. 
Less than two years after joining the decision in Marx, Judge Greene 
wrote a dissenting opinion in State v. Tinoco, indicating that he had 
changed his mind about fog-line violations.  In Tinoco, Judge Greene 
                                                     
 150. Id. at 283. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  See also State v. Hawk, No. 100,096, 2009 WL 744362, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 
2009) (interpreting Marx as declining to follow Ross). 
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adopted both the rationale and outcome in Ross, stating, “I would prefer 
to follow the rationale and outcome of the panel in State v. Ross .  .  .  .  
Although I joined the majority in State v. Marx, . . . I did so only because 
of the obvious factual distinction there.”153  Judge Greene continued: 
The result of the majority’s decision is to license stops for conduct that 
is occasionally, if not routinely, exhibited by nearly every driver on the 
road.  I would put a stop to such stops.  Unless the driver exhibits 
conduct like that in Marx, we should not sanction any deprivation of 
liberty.154 
Although Tinoco allowed Judge Greene to express his new preference for 
Ross, the decision gave two other appellate judges an opportunity to 
distance themselves from the reasoning in the Ross decision.155  
Although Judges Pierron156 and Standridge concluded that the 
defendant’s appeal probably failed under the holding of either Ross or 
Marx, they emphasized that the appellate court “has declined to follow 
Ross in its more recent decision [Marx].”157  The two judges further 
noted that “Tenth Circuit cases that were decided after Ross ha[d] been 
critical” of the decision.158  Thus, as of June 5, 2009, when the Court of 
Appeals issued Tinoco, three judges159 appeared to favor the Ross safety 
test for fog-line violations, and four160 seemed to favor the Marx non-
safety test. 
2. Recent Word from the Kansas Supreme Court 
The Kansas Supreme Court recently reviewed State v. Marx, 
undertaking its own interpretation of K.S.A. section 8-1522(a) to 
“resolve the conflict between Ross and Marx as to the conduct proscribed 
by [subsection (a)], i.e., to determine the elements of the offense.”161  
                                                     
 153. See State v. Tinoco, No. 100,435, 2009 WL 1591644, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Jun. 5, 2009) 
(Greene, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Judges Pierron and Standridge affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 
suppress.  The motion turned on whether a Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper had sufficient legal 
cause to stop a defendant for failing to maintain a single lane when the driver swerved two tire 
widths over a dividing line and into another lane of traffic on one occasion.  Tinoco, 2009 WL 
1591644, at *4–5. 
 156. As noted earlier, Judge Pierron was part of the panel that decided Ross. 
 157. Tinoco, 2009 WL 1591644, at *4. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Judges McAnany, Bukaty, and Greene. 
 160. Judges Pierron, Malone, Leben, and Standridge. 
 161. 215 P.3d 601, 608 (Kan. 2009), aff’g in part, rev’g in part 171 P.3d 276 (Kan. Ct. App. 
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The court sought to “intuit the most logical meaning to ascribe to this 
legislative language.”162  After parsing the statute, the court concluded 
that section 8-1522(a) establishes “two separate rules of the road.”163  
The first rule “requires a driver to keep entirely within a single lane 
while traveling on a roadway with two or more clearly marked lanes,” 
but this rule is “temporarily suspended when it becomes impracticable to 
stay within the lane markers and when the driver is properly effecting a 
lane change.”164  Therefore, “[p]roof that driving outside the lane 
markers created no safety hazard is not a defense to the single lane 
rule.”165  The safety issue arises, according to the Kansas Supreme Court, 
only in the second instance. 
The second rule provides that before a driver may change lanes or 
move from the current lane of travel to another location, he or she must 
ascertain that the movement can be made with safety.  A traffic 
infraction occurs under K.S.A. 8-1522(a) when either rule of the road is 
violated.166 
The court emphasized: “[T]he statute does not make safety a part of the 
equation for determining a violation of the single lane rule.”167 
Turning to whether the facts of the Marx case gave the officer 
reasonable grounds to conduct a stop, the court noted that “K.S.A. 8-
1522(a) is not a strict liability offense” and that the “as nearly as 
practicable” language in the statute “contradicts the notion that any and 
all intrusions upon the marker lines of the chosen travel lane constitute a 
violation.”168  The court acknowledged that weather conditions and 
obstacles in the road could make it impracticable to maintain a single 
lane of traffic and then went further: “[T]he statute even dilutes the 
practicability standard.  It does not say ‘when practicable’ a vehicle will 
be driven entirely within a single lane.  It only requires compliance with 
the single lane rule as nearly as practicable, i.e., compliance that is close 
to that which is feasible.”169  Thus, concluded the court, “a detaining 
officer must articulate something more than an observation of one 
                                                                                                                       
2007). 
 162. Id. at 610. 
 163. Id. at 612. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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instance of a momentary lane breach.”170  But, the fact that a driver 
leaves a single lane without endangering himself or others is 
irrelevant.171 
Accordingly, after the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Marx, to 
justify a stop, an officer need not provide an explanation about how the 
fog-line drift created danger, a relatively tough standard, probably 
requiring a significant amount of explanation.172  However, an officer 
must be able to explain why it was feasible, given the circumstances, for 
the driver to stay within the lane markers.173  While requiring some 
explanation, the standard adopted by the court will probably be met 
whenever an officer credibly testifies that there was little wind, no road 
obstructions, and a relatively straight stretch of road.174  This type of 
testimony will allow some opportunity for a talented cross-examiner to 
reveal inconsistencies in the officer’s explanation that might suggest the 
supposed fog-line violation was concocted as an excuse to investigate for 
drugs, but it falls short of requiring extensive testimony that the danger 
test (established by Ross) would have encouraged.  Thus, like current 
Tenth Circuit case law, Kansas state court decisions offer no special 
protection against pretextual traffic stops based on fog-line infractions.175 
Although the Kansas courts have provided no special protections 
from pretextual stops that begin with traffic infractions, the Kansas 
Supreme Court has imposed one limit on pretextual traffic stops, thereby 
implicitly recognizing that such stops can, at least sometimes, infringe on 
Fourth Amendment (and comparable Kansas constitutional) rights.176  
                                                     
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. (finding that safety is “not a part of the equation” in ascertaining whether or not 
there has been a breach of the single lane requirement). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 612 (stating that an officer must articulate whether or not he knew of circumstances 
“making it impracticable to stay within lane markers,” such as a weather-related issue or a physical 
object in the lane). 
 174. See id. at 613 (explaining the testifying officer just needs to give a rendition of what he 
knew, when he knew it, and “whether the known facts provided him with a reasonable and good 
faith belief that a traffic infraction had occurred”). 
 175. See id. at 605 (concluding that when an officer can articulate facts demonstrating probable 
cause to conduct a traffic stop, the seizure is valid even if pretextual). 
 176. Kansans are protected by both the Fourth Amendment in the federal Constitution and a 
comparable provision in the Kansas Constitution.  KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15 protects Kansans 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, stating: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and property against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on probable 
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched 
and the persons or property to be seized. 
Unlike some other states’ constitutions, which provide citizens with more protection from 
governmental intrusions on privacy and liberty than does the federal Constitution, the Kansas 
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Kansas officers are prohibited from claiming that there was reason to 
believe that a citizen needed help and that a stop was conducted for 
“community caretaking purposes”177 as a ruse for a drug investigation.178  
As the court noted in State v. Marx, “permitting the public safety 
rationale to serve as a pretext for an investigative detention runs the risk 
of emasculating our Fourth Amendment protections.”179 
Of course, a similar emasculation argument can be, and has been, 
made about pretextual traffic stops for minor traffic infractions.  As 
Justice Johnson recently said in his dissent in State v. Greever, a traffic 
infraction case in which the defendant reportedly failed to signal a turn, 
“I am concerned about expanding the circumstances under which law 
enforcement officers are legally permitted to engage in profiling to select 
targets of investigatory detentions.”180  While acknowledging the holding 
in Whren, Justice Johnson continued: 
In my view, that holding permits an officer to select any particular 
profile—Hispanics, teenagers, soccer moms, long-haired men, etc.—
and target those individuals for seizure to investigate any crime 
perceived to be prevalent among the particular group, so long as the 
officer can identify a preceding traffic infraction, no matter how 
innocuous or esoteric the violation.181 
Justice Johnson’s concern that Whren and its Kansas progeny will 
result in racial (or other arbitrary) profiling is not without factual support.  
A study published in 2003 concluded that several Kansas police 
departments were stopping a disproportionate number of black and 
Hispanic people.182  Recognizing the detrimental effects of racial 
profiling, the Kansas legislature has expressly prohibited the practice.183 
                                                                                                                       
Supreme Court has interpreted Section 15 as providing “identical” rights as those protected by the 
Fourth Amendment.  See State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570, 576 (Kan. 2003) (“Section 15 of the Kansas 
Bill of Rights provides protection identical to that provided under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.”).  Thus, a Kansas defendant must convince the trial judge that the 
federal Constitution has been violated or her Section 15 claim fails. 
 177. See Marx, 215 P.3d at 606 (explaining that the “primary motivation for a valid public safety 
stop must be for community caretaking purposes”).  Community caretaking stops would include 
stops to tell a motorist that the gas cap to his car is open or missing, that his trunk is open, that his 
door is ajar, and to return a hubcap that an officer sees a vehicle lose. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. State v. Greever, 183 P.3d 788, 800 (Kan. 2008) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 181. Id. 
 182. See A Multijurisdictional Assessment, supra note 23, at 53–54, 80–81, 90, 105, 111–12, 
127.  Studies in other states have made similar findings.  See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 45, at 747, 
771–72. 
 183. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4606, -4608 (2007) (defining racial profiling and making it 
 
0.6.0_WILSON FINAL 5/31/2010  2:16:00 PM 
1208 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE FOG-LINE DATA 
At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment requires police to act 
reasonably when they stop a car or search a person or vehicle.184  
Arguably, acting reasonably would preclude pretextual searches or 
seizures, in which the police rely on personal animus or unreliable 
stereotypes—race, ethnicity, skin color, or out-of-state status—in 
selecting targets for their traffic stops.  Perhaps for the reasons 
articulated by Justice Johnson in State v. Greever,185 under such a theory 
of reasonableness, Kansas police would violate the Fourth Amendment 
whenever they intentionally select all or only Hispanic drivers to enforce 
K.S.A. section 8-1522(a). 
Despite the intuitive strength of defining Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness in this way, Whren established a different test, one that 
expressly rejects any notion that individual officers are precluded from 
conducting pretextual traffic stops, even if officers choose the targets of 
their stops by unlawful, even unconstitutional,186 criteria.  If an officer 
has reason to believe that a driver has violated a traffic regulation, the 
officer may lawfully stop the car, even if his real desire is to investigate 
for drug trafficking, gun possession, fraud, or another crime for which he 
lacks evidence and reasonable suspicion.  The Fourth Amendment makes 
it irrelevant that the officer picks his target based on good looks, color, 
ethnicity, apparent social status, vehicle type, out-of-state plates, or for 
some other arbitrary reason, such as harassment.  Because Whren 
permits, if not fosters, racist stops, the decision has been repeatedly 
criticized.187 
                                                                                                                       
unlawful for any law-enforcement officer to engage in it). 
 184. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (describing reasonableness as the 
“touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment). 
 185. See State v. Greever, 183 P.3d at 800 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 186. Although beyond the scope of this Article, pretextual stops might, for instance, violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits state actors to “deny to any 
person . . . the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See generally Jennifer 
A. Larrabee, Note, “DWB (Driving While Black)” and Equal Protection: The Realities of an 
Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J. L. & POL’Y 291, 295 (1997) (arguing “that the Equal 
Protection Clause should prevent the police from considering the race of a motorist when deciding 
whom to detain for a traffic violation”). 
 187. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 427 
(1997) (arguing that Whren left African-Americans and Latinos without an effective remedy for 
discriminatory pretextual traffic stops); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other 
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
544, 545–46 (1997) (arguing that Whren makes any citizen fair game for a traffic stop but will result 
in police stopping hugely disproportionate numbers of African-Americans and Hispanics); 
Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the 
Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution 
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For instance, scholars have pointed out that Whren may result in the 
under-enforcement of the law and may cause police to unduly intrude on 
the privacy and liberty of innocent people of color.188  As applied to the 
data gathered for this Article, the under-enforcement argument means 
that Kansas officers may have discovered more illegality had they been 
looking for unlawful conduct by all drivers, not just out-of-state cars and 
cars driven by brown-skinned people.  Potentially, the officers’ use of 
stereotypes dulled their senses and caused them to overlook reasonable 
suspicion in cases of non-Hispanic drivers, resulting in too little 
enforcement of Caucasian or African-American criminals.189 
On the undue intrusion point, the fog-line data does not account for 
any of the fog-line traffic stops in which Kansas police searched without 
finding contraband.  Searches during which the police found no drugs are 
never challenged in criminal court.190  Therefore, it is likely that the data 
significantly underrepresents the number of times Kansas officers 
stopped cars for pretextual reasons, then asked the occupants for, and 
received permission to search, but found no drugs, guns, or aliens.  
“[T]he [exclusionary] rule by its very nature only has the potential to 
address a portion of police violations.”191  As a result, we have no way of 
knowing how many times Kansas officers relied on stereotypes in 
conducting a stop and one or more searches that interfered with the 
liberty and personal privacy of people of color but failed to uncover a 
crime. 
Critics of Whren have also argued that the decision encourages racial 
profiling and that, in turn, racial profiling undermines faith in the entire 
criminal justice system.  David Harris, one of the prominent experts on 
racial profiling, has described the consequences this way: 
                                                                                                                       
of Police Discretion, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1998) (asserting that Whren rendered the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause “essentially useless” in countering selective 
enforcement of the law). 
 188. See Davis, supra note 187, at 427; O’Neill, supra note 45, at 747, 771–72 (reciting 
literature and studies of “disturbing racial disparities in traffic enforcement” including study of stops 
throughout Illinois in which officers “utilized consent searches against Hispanic drivers more than 
twice as often as against Caucasian drivers” although “searches of Caucasians were twice as likely to 
discover contraband as were the searches of minorities”). 
 189. See O’Neill, supra note 45, at 771–72; David Cole, Profiles in Policing, CHAMPION, Apr. 
2002, at 12, 16 (citing studies showing that whites are at least as likely to carry drugs as blacks or 
Hispanics). 
 190. Data from a study of the Wichita Police Department revealed that stops of pedestrians and 
cars leading to searches resulted in the seizure of contraband in only about 3.3% of stops.  
WITHROW, supra note 28, at 47. 
 191. L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A 
New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative 
Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 675 (1998). 
0.6.0_WILSON FINAL 5/31/2010  2:16:00 PM 
1210 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
It has a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the entire justice system.  
It deters people of color from cooperating with the police in criminal 
investigations.  And in the courtroom, it causes jurors of all races and 
ethnicities to doubt the testimony of police officers when they serve as 
witnesses, making criminal cases more difficult to win.192 
The five fog-line cases show why racial profiling would have this 
result.  Officers in each fog-line case testified about wind and road 
conditions and lane drifts, but mentioned nothing about skin color, 
behavior suggesting drug trafficking, or the reliability of stereotypes at 
predicting crime.  The officers rarely mentioned the significance of out-
of-state plates and even when they did, it was in response to cross-
examination.  There is no claim by even one Kansas officer that all (or 
most) drug-traffickers who travel the roads in Kansas are Mexican, 
Puerto Rican, or Central or South American.  None of the officers 
testified that they saw a driver with brown skin, so they followed the car 
to look for suspicious behavior that might indicate drug trafficking and, 
while watching for such behavior, saw the driver deviate from his lane of 
travel.  At least in some of the cases, if not in all of them, this seems to 
be the reality.  Because the pattern of stops suggests that these factors—
skin color, vague suspicion of drug trafficking, and out-of-state status—
played a role, probably a significant one, in all five of the stops that 
formed the basis of the motions to suppress decided between August 1, 
2008 and September 9, 2009, the officers’ testimony should mirror these 
facts, if truthful and forthright. 
If the officers were convinced that they acted reasonably by targeting 
people of color traveling from out of state, or people of Hispanic 
ethnicity who were driving rental vehicles, why did they avoid the 
subject and hedge on the reasons for the stops?  In at least one case, 
United States v. Jose Maldonado,193 the officer expressly denied that race 
or ethnicity was a factor.194  Given the Supreme Court’s express 
sanctioning of pretextual stops, why wouldn’t Kansas officers candidly 
testify to the real circumstances for initiating an investigation? 
It is possible that the officers did not discuss these reasons because 
these characteristics did not impact their decisions to stop the cars.  
Perhaps it is merely a coincidence that all of the fog-line stops involved 
                                                     
 192. Harris, supra note 187, at 3.  See also I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 
83 IND. L.J. 835, 838–41, 862 (2008) (providing an overview of some of the scholarly literature 
arguing that injustices directed at people of color create disrespect for the system). 
 193. 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2009). 
 194. Transcript of Proceedings (Feb. 26, 2009), supra note 46, at 28 (officer denying that he 
chose to follow defendant’s vehicle because defendant was an Hispanic driver). 
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Hispanic occupants.  Given the small sample size, this conclusion is 
plausible.195  It is also possible that the officers did not document these 
reasons and offer them in explanation at the hearings because while skin 
color and other reasons played some role, they played only a 
subconscious one in the officers’ thinking.  Perhaps the officers were not 
cognizant of their true selection criteria and, therefore, did not document 
the reasons or testify about them on direct examination.  Finally, it is at 
least equally likely that the officers consciously considered the factors 
and acted on them, but knowing that the public (and Kansas’s district 
court judges) would be troubled by such seemingly arbitrary and 
morally-suspect standards for a criminal investigation, the officers 
struggled to identify other, more palatable bases to stop a car and 
investigate its occupants.196  Because Whren allows a seizure for any 
traffic infraction, officers and prosecutors were not legally obligated to 
tell the whole story.  The government’s case can survive a motion to 
suppress as long as a preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
officer had some reasonable basis for the stop and that he did not 
subsequently exceed the scope of reasonableness during a follow-up 
investigation. 
The pattern in Kansas fog-line stops makes it appear that Kansas 
police are engaging in ethnicity-based profiling.  Yet the testimony of 
Kansas officers fails to explain why such profiles are valid or to explain 
that the ethnicity of the drivers and occupants was nothing more than a 
coincidence.  Even if the United States Supreme Court precedent makes 
such an explanation legally irrelevant, the lack of transparency in the 
officers’ testimony causes police to appear dishonest.  To the extent 
police strain to cover up the real reasons for a traffic stop, their testimony 
will appear contrived and untruthful, creating public and judicial distrust 
of their otherwise laudable work.  Perhaps this taint of untruth explains 
why the district judges granted 40% of the defendants’ motions to 
suppress in the five fog-line cases. 
Finally, if it turns out that discriminatory fog-line police stops in 
Kansas are not a coincidence and that they reflect a police policy of 
discrimination, the stops may be unconstitutional notwithstanding 
                                                     
 195. It is less plausible, however, given that many of the published Tenth Circuit decisions also 
appear to involve Hispanic defendants. 
 196. See Harris, supra note 187, at 19 (“Pretextual traffic stops fuel the belief that the police are 
not only unfair and biased, but untruthful as well.  Each pretextual traffic stop involves an untruth, 
and both the officer and the driver recognize this. . . . Stopping a driver for a traffic offense when the 
officer’s real purpose is drug interdiction is a lie—a legally sanctioned one, to be sure, but a lie 
nonetheless.”). 
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Whren.197  Although the Supreme Court has ruled that an individual 
officer’s conduct will be judged by an objective, Fourth Amendment 
standard, the Court has yet to decide that programmatic motives are 
irrelevant in the investigation of criminal conduct.  If police departments 
within Kansas encourage or acquiesce in a policy to follow and 
investigate Hispanic drivers as a pretext for drug investigations, the 
principles of Whren do not apply.198  Whren did not hold that law 
enforcement agencies act “reasonably” when they adopt discriminatory 
policies governing investigations.  Arguably, programmatic motives 
should and do matter, even in traffic stops, and even after Whren. 
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond,199 “while ‘[s]ubjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,’ programmatic 
purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions 
undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized 
suspicion. . . . Whren does not preclude an inquiry into programmatic 
purpose in such contexts.”200  Although Edmond too is readily 
distinguishable from the typical fog-line case because it concerned the 
legality of a suspicionless roadblock, the principles of Edmond should 
extend to cases in which every member of a police department is 
expected to pursue, follow, and investigate cars tagged from out-of-state 
but ignore those who cross the fog line but bear a Kansas tag.  The 
principles of Edmond should also apply to a police policy that 
encourages all officers to stop disproportionate numbers of Hispanic 
drivers in an effort to catch drug dealers.  As the Court indicated in 
Edmond, “cases dealing with intrusions that occur pursuant to a general 
scheme absent individualized suspicion have often required an inquiry 
into purpose at the programmatic level.”201  The limited data, which 
                                                     
 197. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4610 (2008) (requiring all Kansas law enforcement agencies to 
adopt a written policy prohibiting racial profiling). 
 198. Because Kansas requires a written policy prohibiting racial profiling, it will be difficult to 
prove that a department’s actual policy is different.  Nevertheless, a department may condone 
profiling informally or train their officers in ways that promote discriminatory stops notwithstanding 
a formal and written policy to the contrary.  The 2003 study showing that multiple police 
departments in Kansas were engaging in discriminatory stops is evidence that officers may be acting 
pursuant to such a police custom, culture, or “policy,” even if the policy is informal and contrary to 
the department’s written policy.  See A Multijurisdictional Assessment, supra note 23, at 11. 
 199. 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000). 
 200. Id. at 45–46 (citation omitted). 
 201. Id. at 46.  See also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (“[A]n inventory search must not 
be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.”); Colorado v. 
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (indicating that bad faith and the lack of a pure investigative 
purpose mattered to the validity of an inventory search, a search that does not rest on reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause). 
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show a pattern of stopping cars with no intention of ticketing the drivers, 
suggests that some police departments within Kansas may have 
programmatic policies encouraging officers to investigate certain types 
of cars and drivers for drugs, regardless of suspicion.  If so, these policies 
should be governed by cases limiting suspicionless seizures and searches 
of drivers and cars.  Thus, under the reasoning of Edmond, such 
suspicionless investigations violate the Fourth Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Whren, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned pretextual 
traffic stops.  In practice the holding of Whren condones police 
investigations that target certain suspect classes of people, like 
Hispanics, for increased police scrutiny.  In permitting pretextual stops, 
the Court ignored the risk that such practices will encourage police to 
distort the truth, overlooked the cost of under-enforcement of the laws, 
and ignored the consequences to the criminal justice system of race and 
ethnicity based discrimination. 
Kansas law exacerbates these risks by making fog-line stops a model 
for protecting ulterior motives from a sifting judicial inquiry.  In Kansas, 
it makes no difference that every driver occasionally crosses the fog line 
or that an individual driver left his lane without presenting any danger to 
another person, object, or animal.  As long as a Kansas officer can 
credibly testify that the weather and road conditions made it practicable 
to stay within a single lane but that the driver did not, the officer has 
grounds for a stop, which gives him a chance to ask to search. 
Despite Kansas officers’ apparent practice of stopping certain cars 
and certain people, claiming that the cars left their primary lane of travel, 
and notwithstanding that federal and Kansas law make fog-line 
infractions easy to prove, judges in the District of Kansas have granted 
40% of motions to suppress evidence in recent fog-line cases.  The 
relative success of defendants at suppressing evidence in these cases 
should cause Kansas police to question the effectiveness of pretextual 
fog-line stops, especially given the risk that the public will perceive 
pretextual stops as motivated by skin color and ethnicity and considering 
the evidence from other states that discriminatory searches are 
counterproductive in uncovering crime. 
 
